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ABSTRACT
Proposed that people tend to avoid others when they focus on negative possible
outcomes (i.e., when generating avoidance goals) but approach others when they focus on
positive possible outcomes (i.e., when generating approach goals). A second proposal
suggested that people avoid outgroup members more than they do ingroup members
because they focus chronically, and disproportionately, on negative possible outcomes in
their intergroup interactions. To test these proposals, 192 heterosexual participants
engaged in dyadic interactions with either a Straight (ingroup) or Gay (outgroup) partner,
under one of 3 goal framing instructions: Approach, Avoid, or Control. Measures of
avoidance (chair distance, eye contact, and period of time that contact was maintained)
were collected throughout the interaction. Predictions stated that the Avoid group would
demonstrate more avoidance than Controls, who would demonstrate more avoidance than
the Approach group; a second prediction specified that participants in the Gay, Control
condition would show more avoidance than would participants in the Straight, Control
condition. Results failed to confirm the predictions, though other, exploratory analyses
do provide interesting leads.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest obstacles to smooth intergroup relations is, arguably,
simple avoidance. Physically and mentally, people disengage from others who differ
from them in identifiable ways. Avoidance poses a serious threat to intergroup
harmony because, politically and interpersonally, people care most for their friends
and families: Strangers are excluded from the net of care.
Why do people avoid outgroup members? The current research proposes that
people avoid outgroup members because people have the wrong goals for their
interactions. People avoid outgroup members because they focus disproportionately
on the risk of negative outcomes, rather than the possibility of positive outcomes, in
their interactions with them. People worry about saying something offensive or naive,
they worry about provoking anger or awkward misunderstandings. The novelty and
complexity of intergroup relations easily overwhelms the well-intentioned.
Meanwhile, people seldom view intergroup relations as opportunities for satisfying
positive goals, such as making friends or learning about new lifestyles. People are so
occupied with following the rules ~ whether or not there really are any rules - that
they overlook the fact that good things come from cross-group relations.
To support this thesis, this paper reviews the literature on goals and behavior,
giving special emphasis to distinctions between approach and avoidance framing.
Early sections present evidence that avoidance framing produces interpersonal
disengagement, concluding that, because intergroup contexts cue avoidance frames.
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people disengage from outgroup members. Later sections discuss potential mediators
of the relation between goal framing and avoidance. A final section presents and
discusses an experiment designed to test the proposed relations.
Goals Guide Behavior
The idea that goals guide behavior has sparked and sustained the work of
several contemporary theorists. For example, Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1982) have
contended that "self-completion," or, the attainment of meaningful goals, spurs
identity development; similarly, Emmons (1986) has argued that "personal strivings"
shape and define personality. More broadly, Snyder and Cantor (1998) have proposed
that people's individual, interpersonal, relationship, and group-level "agendas" guide
both their personality and their social behavior (see also Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987,
on "life tasks"). In other fields, Elliott and Dweck (1988) have suggested that goals
influence achievement efforts, and Fiske (1993) has explored the impact of goals on
social perception. This literature argues that goals can be used to understand, and to
predict, human behavior.
Additional work has produced more precise models of how goals influence
behavior, including, for example. Carver and Scheier's (1990) dual-process model.
Their model defines goals as composites of two representations: 1 ) higher-level
representations of outcomes that serve as endpoints to behavior, and, 2) lower-level
representations that specify overt movements toward or away from those outcomes.
Similarly, goal sequences can be activated in two ways: 1) through the conscious
formation of intentions, or, 2) through the simple activation of associated schemas.
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This means that goal pursuit may be eUcited in a more or less conscious and controlled
manner.
Consistent with these ideas, empirical evidence affirms the link between (both
conscious and unconscious) goals and behavior. Demonstrating the power of
consciously activated goals, Ajzen and colleagues (e.g., Ajzen, 1985) reliably find
significant correlations between intentions and behavior. Other work confirms a role
for unconsciously activated goals (e.g., Carver, Ganellen, Froming, & Chambers,
1983; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). For example, Wilson and Capitman (1982)
activated a "romance" schema by asking participants (under different pretexts) to read
a boy-meets-girl story. When an attractive girl entered the room moments later,
participants who had read the story displayed more behaviors directed toward romantic
outcomes than participants who had read a different story.
Distinctions between Approach and Avoidance Goals
The previous paragraphs detailed evidence for the link between goals and
behavior. To examine how goals might condition avoidance more specifically, this
section turns to the distinction between approach and avoidance framing.
Distinctions between approach and avoidance framing have proven
fundamental to research on goals. Despite their differences, variants agree that goals
can be divided into two types: those that focus on posifive outcomes (approach), and
those that focus on negative outcomes (avoidance). The following examples illustrate.
A first variant derives from Carver and Scheier's (1990) model of self-
regulation. This model distinguishes between discrepancy-reducing (approach) and
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discrepancy-amplifying (avoidance) feedback loops. Discrepancy-reducing loops
encourage movement toward a desired outcome, while discrepancy-amplifying loops
encourage movement away from an undesired outcome.
Differing only in terminology, Higgins (1996) distinguishes between a
promotion focus and a prevention focus. People operating under a promotion focus
are alert to opportunities; survival in the world means attaining accomplishments and
fulfilling aspirations. Those using a prevention focus concentrate on avoiding
potential dangers; survival in the world means attaining safety and meeting
obligations.
In a third variant, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) distinguish between gain and
loss framing, where gain framing implies a focus on positive outcomes, whereas loss
framing implies a focus on negative outcomes.
Last, Wurf and Markus (1991) suggest that people have positive possible
selves and negative possible selves. By their account, people guide their behavior by
approaching visions of themselves as they would ideally like to be, and by avoiding
visions of themselves as they fear they might become.
Each of these variants shares the central approach/avoidance distinction,
though they do emphasize different factors in goal activation. Carver and Scheier
(1990), with Tversky and Kahneman (1981), emphasize that environmental contexts
cue goals, whereas Higgins (1996), together with Wurf and Markus (1991), recognizes
important individual differences in how people frame events. While acknowledging
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the importance of individual differences, this paper focuses on situational determinants
of goal framing.
Goal Framing vs. Outcome Expectancies
Before moving to the remainder of the review, we take a moment to clarify the
distinction between goal framing and outcome expectancies. Goal framing.-- the
target of the current research - relates to the relative salience of positive and negative
outcomes (e.g., for someone with an avoidance frame, negative possible outcomes are
more salient than positive possible outcomes). Outcome expectancies describe the
subjective probabilities associated with positive and negative outcomes (e.g., for a
pessimist, negative outcomes seem more likely than positive outcomes). In practice,
outcome focus and outcome expectancies seem to be closely related, each influencing
the other. For example, increasing the salience of a given outcome tends to inflate
estimates of its probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973); likewise, increasing the
likelihood of a given outcome could increase its salience. Nevertheless, there are
times when goal framing is not consistent with outcome expectancies. Certainly,
perceivers may believe that negative outcomes are unlikely but still ruminate on them;
alternately, perceivers may believe that positive outcomes are improbable but still
fantasize about them. In all likelihood, goal framing is really a joint function of a
perceiver's outcome expectancies and the evaluations attached to these expectancies,
so that extremely positive or extremely negative outcomes figure prominently in
people's thoughts and behavior even when they seem unlikely (e.g., in gambling or
phobic reactions). Regardless, the central point holds that goal framing and outcome
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expectancies are theoretically distinct: Framing describes a passive cognitive set,
whereas expectancies describe conscious beliefs. Beyond this, establishing the
functional relations between the constructs remains a task for future research.
Avoidance Goals Prompt Task Disengagement
Several lines of research already testify to the link between approach/avoidance
framing and behavior (e.g., Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Some of this
research supports the idea that avoidance framing produces avoidant reactions:
Research on achievement-related goals suggests that approach goals elicit task
persistence, while avoidance goals elicit task disengagement. Moreover, and in
consequence, goals framed in terms of positive outcomes elicit better performance
than goals framed in terms of negative outcomes. Note that it is possible (though yet
unproven) that goal-conditioned experiences of success or failure reciprocally
influence how events are framed in the future. Once having failed a task, and with the
memory of failure fresh in their minds, people may be increasingly likely to frame
future encounters in terms of negative outcomes. On the other hand, experiences of
success should also produce memories, and hence, a tendency to focus on positive
possible outcomes.
As one example of this work, Roney, Higgins, and Shah (1995) manipulated
regulatory focus on an anagram task by having participants focus on either positive or
negative outcomes. Participants in the positive-outcome-focus condition read: "If you
are able to solve 22 out of the 25 anagrams, you will get to play the 'Wheel of
Fortune' game. Otherwise, you will do the 'unvaried repetition' task." Participants in
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the negative-outcome-focus condition read: "If you get 4 out of the 25 anagrams
wrong, you will do the 'unvaried repetition' task. Otherwise, you will play the 'Wheel
of Fortune' game" (p. 1 154). As expected, persistence on the anagrams task was
greater in the positive-focus condition, as was performance.
Dovetailing with these findings, work on possible selves suggests that a focus
on positive (rather than negative) possible futures enhances effort, and, hence,
performance (Wurf& Markus, 1991). In a representative study (Ruvolo & Markus,
1986, in Wurf& Markus, 1991), one group of participants imagined themselves
succeeding, such that "everything they hoped for had been realized and that things had
gone as well as they possibly could have." A second group envisioned failure, such
that "they had worked very hard and everything had gone as badly as it possibly could
have." Here, people who imagined positive futures persisted longer at a left-handed
writing task than did people who imagined negative futures.
Research on control and self-efficacy comes to analogous conclusions,
revealing that people who believe that positive outcomes are likely work longer, and
hence perform better, than the less optimistic (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Diener & Dweck,
1980; Feather, 1961). Thus, in a study by Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, and Stock (1981),
participants explained either why they might succeed, or why they might fail, at an
anagrams task. Next, participants predicted their level of performance. Participants
who explained why they might succeed later predicted, and achieved, higher
performance than those who explained why they might fail.
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In conclusion, the research on achievement suggests that avoidance framing
prompts task disengagement. Still, it remains unclear that this conclusion generalizes
to interpersonal contexts. Do avoidance goals cause people to avoid others, just as
they would avoid nonsocial tasks? To answer this question, the next section explores
the literature on goal framing within social interactions.
Avoidance Goals Mav Also Prompt Social Avoidance
The preceding research implies that avoidance framing produces interpersonal
avoidance. People who focus on negative outcomes in their interactions with others
should be quick to disengage from those interactions. However, limited evidence
actually substantiates this claim. Further, the scant data available focus exclusively on
intergroup contexts, neglecting intragroup processes.
William Ickes's (1984) work comes closest to a direct study ofhow goal
framing shapes interpersonal avoidance. For this study, White participants reported on
their desires to either seek out or shun (e.g., approach vs. avoid) interaction with Black
students. Several weeks later, both White and Black students were called to the lab, in
pairs, for brief interactions. As predicted. Whites predisposed to avoid interactions
with Blacks looked and smiled at their partners less than those predisposed to initiate
interaction. Given that looking and smiling imply mental avoidance, these findings
confirm that avoidance goals prompt social avoidance.
While intriguing, results from Ickes's (1984) work do not lend themselves to
broad conclusions about goal framing. First, results were qualified by race of the
experimenter: Avoidance goals exerted their influence only when the experimenter
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was Black, such that the White participant was the minority. Further concerns derive
from the correlational nature of the study. In particular, avoidance goals may have
been confounded with third variables (e.g., prejudice level), weakening conclusions
concerning framing's causal role. Last, Ickes's work focuses on how the motivations
to approach or avoid a particular group affect behavior, whereas our question concerns
the broader processes of outcome framing.
With a stretch, Macrae and colleagues' research on rebound effects can also be
interpreted as support for the link between framing and interpersonal avoidance. In
one study, Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten (1994) showed participants a color
photograph of a male skinhead. Half the participants were told that they should try to
avoid stereotyping the target, and the other half were given no special instructions. In
a subsequent encounter, participants who had been told to suppress their stereotypes
sat farther from the target than did controls. Again, consistent with work on
achievement-related goals, these results suggest that the attempt to avoid undesirable
outcomes (here, undesirable thoughts) can provoke behavioral avoidance. Still,
because stereotype suppression is not a perfect operationalization of what is meant by
avoidance framing, the observed relations require further confirmation.
Last, research on cooperative interdependence indirectly supports the thesis
that approach/avoidance framing influences interpersonal avoidance. Complementing
Ickes's (1984) and Macrae et al.'s (1994) findings, this work suggests that focusing on
the possibility of positive outcomes in intergroup relations prompts the development
of friendly, personalized relationships (Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp,
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1978; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1953). As in the preceding work,
however, looseness in the connections between the manipulated variables and goal
framing, and between the dependent variables and avoidance, means that further work
is needed to establish causal patterns.
To sum up, past research is suggestive of, but by no means conclusive on,
general relationships between avoidance framing and interpersonal avoidance.
Chronic Frames: Avoidance Goals and Intergroup Relations
By this juncture, we stand to address the critical point of this paper. Our key
thesis has been that people avoid outgroup members because they frame intergroup
relations in terms of avoidance goals, and previous pages provided tentative evidence
to this effect. The following section defends the proposal that intergroup contexts
chronically, and automatically, evoke avoidance goals.
Theoretically, the choice to frame situations in terms of either approach or
avoidance goals is arbitrary. People can choose to focus on either the positive, or the
negative, possible outcomes of their interactions. Nevertheless, different socialization
experiences could make one type of goal predominant over the other. Consistent with
these ideas, Higgins and colleagues (Higgins, Roney
,
Crowe, & Hymes, 1 994)
speculate that reinforcement history may condition chronic outcome focus. They
propose that the frequent occurrence of positive outcomes, combined with the
relatively infrequent occurrence of negative outcomes, conditions chronic approach
framing. Alternatively, the predominance of negative outcomes over positive
outcomes conditions chronic avoidance framing.
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Operating through the same mechanism, our societal and personal histories of
intergroup relations may have subtly conditioned us to frame relations with outgroup
members in terms of avoidance goals. Americans have borne witness to flatly
catastrophic conflicts between majority and minority groups (e.g., World Wai- II).
Exacerbating the problem, television, newspapers, and magazines daily expose
Americans to a biased sample of outcomes, with the weight on negative outcomes.
(Violence and conflict make snappy headlines, but cooperation and friendship rarely
make the news at all.) Meanwhile, people typically have limited experience with
rewarding relations across group boundaries. Thus, in representations of intergroup
relations, negative outcomes may predominate, and this could prime people to focus
on the negative, rather than the positive, possible outcomes in their interactions with
outgroup members.
Mediators Between Goal Framing and Avoidance in Social Interactions
Until now, the evidence has pointed to a relation between avoidance framing
and interpersonal avoidance. Still, the translation from goals to behavior remains
murky. How, precisely, might avoidance goals condition interpersonal avoidance? It
is to this question that the review now turns.
Earlier, we described Carver and Scheier's (1990) proposal that goals can
influence behavior either consciously, through the formation of intentions, or, more
automatically, through situational construals. According to this view, goal framing
shapes people's behavior in two distinct ways. However, given that people may, or
11
may not, be aware of the relation between their goals and behavior, there are actually 3
ways that goals may influence behavior.
First, people may have conscious goals to approach or avoid outcomes in an
interaction, and their behavior may follow directly from conscious choices about the
achievement of those goals. Second, people may have conscious goals in an
interaction, yet their behavior may be an unconsciously produced result of those goals.
Third, people's goals in an interaction may be unconscious, and their behavior may
also be an unconscious consequence of those goals.
In the first case, goals translate into behavior smoothly and obviously (i.e.,
through the deliberate formation of intentions). However, goal translation in the latter
two cases requires elaboration. If people are not aware of their goals, or, if they are
not aware of how their goals are influencing their behavior, then how can goals affect
behavior?
One possibility is that negative emotion mediates the relationship between goal
framing and avoidance. Several findings suggest that avoidance goals provoke greater
negative emotion than approach goals. Coats, Janoff-Bulman, and Alpert (1996)
found that participants who generally framed life in terms of avoidance goals
evaluated themselves less positively on measures of self-esteem, optimism, and
depression. Further, participants primed with avoidance goals reported lower
perceptions of success and satisfaction with their performance on creative tasks.
Similar results obtain in a study by Elliott, Sheldon, and Church (1997). Here,
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avoidance goals were related to decreases in subjective well-being from the beginning
to the end of the semester, relative to approach goals.
If avoidance goals provoke negative emotion, then negative emotion could
mediate avoidance by serving as a negative reinforcer for social withdrawal (since
withdrawal puts an end to the negative emotion). Alternatively, negative emotion
could mediate avoidance by priming mood-congruent material, and hence, unfavorable
evaluations of interaction partners. People who feel rotten may dislike their
interaction partners, and, as a result, break off their relations. In either case, generally
negative emotions could prompt avoidance.
Other findings implicate a narrower role for anxiety. As one example,
Higgins's work (e.g., Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman,
1997) suggests that achievement tasks framed in terms of negative outcomes cause
greater change in agitation-calm-related emotions, and less change in dejection-
cheerfulness-related emotions, than those same tasks framed in terms of positive
outcomes. In short, the potential for anxiety is greater under avoidance framing than
approach framing. In a second example, Ickes's (1984) study produces convergent
findings, revealing that both White and Black members of avoidance dyads reported
greater anxiety around their interactions than did members of approach dyads.
Anxiety constitutes a clear candidate for mediation of the goal-behavior link.
In humans as in other species, anxiety reliably prompts escape behavior (Gray, 1982,
1987) and avoidance of social interactions in particular (Watson & Friend, 1969;
Stephan & Stephan, 1985).
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And yet, further possibilities exist. Along different lines, goal framing effects
could be mediated by the specificity of action plans that different goals imply. While
approach goals may cue concrete behavioral plans, avoidance goals might not suggest
clear procedures for avoiding negative outcomes. In the absence of clear indications
for how to behave, people who frame their interactions in terms of avoidance goals
may prefer to exit the situation, rather than tolerate the strain of uncertainty. Wurf and
Markus (1991) concur with these speculations, remarking that "Negative possible
selves... only provide an indication of what not to do. By themselves, they cannot
direct one's actions or effectively regulate behavior" (p. 56). Moreover, evidence
already suggest that, when people have specific, concrete plans to supplement their
goal intentions, goal attainment becomes more likely (Gollwitzer & Brandstaetter,
1 997; Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). When people furnish their goal intentions with
implementation intentions, the initiation of goal-directed responses becomes
automatized: People respond quickly, efficiently, and appropriately to situational cues,
initiating the correct behaviors and resisting temptations and bad habits.
Last, when people interact with members of stereotyped groups, the relations
between goals and avoidance may also be mediated by stereotyping. Fiske and
Neuberg's (1990) continuum model of impression formation suggests the link. This
model suggests that, when people are motivated to be accurate, and when cognitive
resources are available, people tend to seek out, and remember, counterstereotypic
information; otherwise, they rely on easily-accessed stereotypes. Motivation and
capacity drive individuation. However, people operating under avoidance framing
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tend to lack both resources. Evidence already suggests that avoidance framing
undermines intrinsic motivation (Elliott & Haraciewicz, 1996). Further, the very
attempt to avoid negative outcomes -- where outcomes include one's own thoughts
and behaviors -- can consume cognitive capacity (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, &
Ford, 1997; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). Thus, people operating under avoidance
framing may be particularly likely to stereotype their interaction partners, and, to the
extent that such stereotypes are negative, avoidance should follow.
Actually, the tendency to stereotype under avoidance framing may be
compounded by the activation of negative emotions, including anxiety, discussed
earlier. Research on mood and stereotyping has repeatedly demonstrated that high-
arousal, negative moods encourage stereotyping (see Mackie & Hamilton, 1993, for a
review). For example, Esses and Zanna (1995) found that participants subjected to a
negative mood manipulation were more likely than controls to attribute unfavorable
stereotypes to Native Indian, Pakistani, and Arabic people.
In support of the above proposals, studies of intergroup relations indirectly
confirm that avoidance goals produce stereotyping. Macrae et al.'s (1994) work,
mentioned in the preceding sections, illustrates this process. In their study, people told
to suppress their stereotypes of skinheads showed faster response latencies to
skinhead-related words than did controls. Similarly, Wegner (1997; in Bargh, 1997)
found that participants attempting to suppress their stereotypes of women responded to
them more pejoratively than participants who were not told to suppress their
stereotypes.
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To conclude, when people form conscious intentions to realize their goals in
interaction with outgroup members, the influence of goals on behavior may be direct.
Alternately, when people are unaware of how their behavior is connected to their
goals, the relationship between goals and avoidance may be mediated by 4 variables.
Goals may condition avoidance through their influence on negative emotions in
general, through their influence on anxiety in particular, or through the specificity of
the behavioral plans that they cue. When people interact with members of stereotyped
groups, goals may condition avoidance through the additional mediation of
stereotyping.
New Directions in Goal Framing
The research reviewed in this paper suggests, but does not demonstrate,
relationships between goal framing, avoidance, and mediating variables. The current
research aimed to test these relationships by manipulating goal framing and
ingroup/outgroup status, and by measuring a set of potential mediators. We expected
that, in the absence of overt manipulations (i.e., in control conditions), people would
tend to avoid outgroup members and approach ingroup members (consistent with the
tendency to frame intergroup interactions in terms of avoidance goals, but intragroup
interactions in terms of approach goals). However, we also expected that encouraging
people to frame their interactions in terms of approach or avoidance goals, regardless
of partner status, should temper, or even erase, differences in how people responded to
ingroup and outgroup members. That is, instating avoidance goals should prompt all
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participants to avoid their partners, whereas instating approach goals should prompt all
participants to approach their partners.
To test these ideas, the experiment used a 2 (partner orientation: Straight or
Gay) X 3 (goal framing: Approach, Avoid, or Control) design. Heterosexual
participants arrived at the lab in pairs under the pretext of a study on "Group
Interactions." Half the participants met a "straight" partner, representing a member of
the ingroup; the other half met a "gay" partner, a member of the outgroup. Both
"straight" and "gay" partners were female confederates (hence, the majority of
participants, who were female, interacted with a same-sex partner). Participants from
both groups were assigned to one of 3 framing conditions, reading instructions that
primed an approach goal, an avoidance goal, or no goal. Immediately after the
instruction period, all participants interacted with their partners. Following the
interaction, confederates and experimenters recorded how close participants moved
their chairs to confederates, the amount of time that participants maintained contact,
and eye contact, forming the composite measure of avoidance. The following
hypotheses were formulated:
a. A main effect for partner. Given societally unfavorable attitudes toward
homosexual people, we expected that participants interacting with "gay"
partners would demonstrate more avoidance than participants interacting with
"straight" partners.
b. A main effect for goal framing. Consistent with the research on framing
effects, a second prediction specified that participants primed with avoidance
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goals would demonstrate more interpersonal avoidance than controls, who
would demonstrate more avoidance than participants primed with approach
goals.
c. Differences across control groups. This paper argued that people chronically
and automatically employ avoidance goals in their interactions with outgroup
members, whereas this is not the case for interactions with ingroup members.
Thus, a third prediction specified that, in interactions involving "gay" partners,
participants primed with approach goals would differ from the other two
groups, whereas control participants would not differ from participants primed
with avoidance goals. Conversely, in interactions involving "straight"
partners, participants primed with avoidance goals would differ from the other
two groups, but control participants would not differ from participants primed
with approach goals.
d. Mediators between goal framing and avoidance. We assumed that goal
framing would influence avoidance indirectly (i.e., not entirely through the
deliberate formation of intentions). Thus, for both Straight and Gay
conditions, we expected that self-reported negative emotion, anxiety, and
behavioral plan specificity might mediate relations between goal framing and
avoidance.
e. Experienced emotion. In line with research on outcome focus and self-
regulation (e.g., Roney et al., 1995; Higgins et al., 1997), we formulated
additional predictions about the emotions that people would experience under
18
different goal framings. We predicted that avoidance goals would produce
greater changes in agitation-calm-related emotions than dejection-cheerfulness-
related emotions, whereas the reverse would hold for approach goals.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Participants
209 participants were recruited from Psychology courses at the University of
Massachusetts in exchange for course credit. Discarding 8 participants for suspicion,
and another 9 because they did not identify as heterosexual, yielded a final N of 192
(41 males, 151 females). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 6
experimental conditions. Data were collected over two semesters, with minor changes
in the second semester directed at solving problems identified in the first (these noted
later).
Pre-Interaction
Participants were scheduled in pairs. In addition, two female confederates
arrived as the study commenced.
To begin, participants read a page of instructions. The instructions stated that
the goal of the study was to "explore how people discuss intergroup relations, and how
these discussions affect their thoughts and feelings about each other." Participants
also read that, toward that goal, two groups of people had been recruited for the study:
A first group was from the general UMass student body, and a second was from the
Lesbian Gay Bisexual Student Union (LGBSU). According to the instructions, each
participant would be paired with another student to discuss intergroup relations, such
that half were paired with a partner from the same group as they, whereas the other
half were assigned to an outgroup member. In fact, each participant was assigned to
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one of the confederates. Finally, participants read that the study involved two parts: an
introductory period, and a discussion. During the introductory period, participants
would take turns introducing themselves to their partners, with the order of turns being
randomly determined. Following the introductions, a general discussion would ensue.
These last instructions aimed only to support the cover story. In reality, the
experiment stopped after participants had introduced themselves to confederates.
Partner identification. After participants had read their instructions, the
experimenter indicated whom, among the others, each participant had for a partner.
To manipulate partner orientation, everyone received an identification slip.
Over the fall semester of data collection, the experimenter gave participants
prewritten slips specifying the names and alleged orientations of their partners. Half
received slips indicating that their partner was from the general UMass student body
(Straight condition), and half received slips indicating that their partner was from the
LGBSU (Gay condition). To maintain appearances that confederates were actual
participants, the experimenter also gave confederates (blank) identification slips.
Because slips were prewritten and folded, the experimenter and confederates remained
blind to condition.
This procedure changed slightly for spring data collection. During fall
collection, it became evident that some participants thought we had given confederates
slips falsely identifying them (participants) as gay. Thus, over spring collection, we
allowed participants and confederates to complete the identification slips themselves,
and then exchange them. Participants received blank slips, where they themselves
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recorded their first names and location of recruitment (circling "general UMass student
body," rather than "LGBSU"). This time, confederates received the prewritten slips
identifying their alleged orientations. Confederates pretended to open and complete
these slips themselves, but, in fact, did not open them at all. When all present had
completed, or pretended to complete, their slips, they exchanged and read them. Thus,
once again, both experimenter and confederates remained blind to condition.
Framing manipulation. Following partner identification, participants
completed a questionnaire "designed to prepare you for your introductions." This
questionnaire attempted to manipulate goal framing. Note that confederates faked
completing these questionnaires as well, maintaining the illusion that they were actual
participants.
At the outset, we isolated the effects of goal framing from the effects of
outcome expectancies by providing participants with constant outcome expectancies.
However, the precise phrasing of this information instated a particular goal frame.
Participants assigned to the Approach condition read the following: "About 90 per
cent of the time, people get along in this study." Avoidance groups read that "About
1 0 per cent of the time, people do not get along in this study." Finally, Control groups
read that "About 90 per cent of the time, people get along in this study; about 10 per
cent of the time, they do not get along." The remainder of the questionnaire reinforced
these frames.
Over the fall semester, Approach groups read a short paragraph instructing
them to brainstorm for all of the pleasant things that could possibly result from their
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interactions. Participants used one blank page to record their responses, guided by 3
prompts ("I might...", "My partner might...", and "In the long run, good outcomes
might include..."). Conversely, participants assigned to the Avoid condition
brainstormed for all of the unpleasant things that could possibly result from their
introductions. These participants responded to the same 3 prompts, with the exception
that the third prompt became, "In the long run, bad outcomes might include...".
Participants assigned to the Control group brainstormed for all of the things that could
possibly result from their introductions, leaving them to focus on either pleasant or
unpleasant outcomes, as they wished. Again, Control participants responded to the
same 3 prompts, with the exception that the third prompt became, "In the long run,
possible outcomes might include...".
For spring data collection, the procedure was altered in an attempt to
strengthen the manipulations while allowing participants more freedom in determining
the content of their responses. Spring manipulations provided higher estimates of the
likelihood of unpleasant interactions (participants expected negative interactions one
quarter of the time). These questionnaires also used more vivid, evocative phrasing.
Last, Approach and Avoid groups responded to a single prompt ("1 would like to..." or
"I would like to avoid..."), and Control participants listed both what they wanted to
happen, and what they wanted to avoid. Despite these changes, spring manipulations
were essentially equivalent to fall manipulations. Confirming this view, multivariate
analyses indicate that scores on the dependent measures do not reliably differ as a
function of semester.
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Mood Checklist I. Once participants had finished the framing manipulation,
the experimenter directed everyone to complete a first mood checklist. Checklists
were prefaced with the justification that measuring mood would later allow us to
control for mood's "unpredictable effects on impression formafion."
The checklist we chose was adopted from Higgins et al. (1997), selected
because it was used throughout Higgins's work, and should produce theoretically
comparable results. Higgins's checklist requires participants to indicate how much, on
a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very strongly), they are currently experiencing each of
12 emotions. Four items measure dejection (disappointed, discouraged, low, sad), 4
measure agitation (agitated, on edge, uneasy, tense), two measure calm (calm,
relaxed), and two measure cheerfulness (happy, satisfied). Summing agitation-related
and calm-related items (reverse-scored) produces an overall score for agitation-calm-
related emotions. Similarly, summing dejection-related and cheerfulness-related items
(reverse-scored) yields an overall score for dejection-cheerfulness-related emotions.
Last, summing over all items (reverse-scoring where appropriate) produces a general
measure of negative emotion.
Avoidance During the Interaction
Following the mood checklist, participants were paired with their partners and
taken to the interaction rooms.
Chair distance. Each room was equipped with one regular chair and one
swivel chair. Confederates entered the room ahead of participants and selected the
regular chair, leaving the swivel chair ~ at the opposite end of the room - for their
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partners. This forced participants to select the swivel chair. When participants had
moved their chairs to a stable point, confederates noted the position, to be recorded
following the interaction.
lime. Confederates also measured the amount of time participants maintained
contact. All participants were told that they had been assigned to introduce themselves
first, and were given a list of possible topics. The experimenter stressed that "You'll
have up to 5 minutes to introduce yourself, but you don't have to take the full 5
minutes... You should just say as much as you want to say, and then open up the
outside door." When the experimenter left, participants began their introductions, and
confederates started their timers. Confederates stopped their timers as soon as
participants opened the outside door, recording the result following the interaction.
Eve contact. As a third measure of avoidance, confederates attended to, and
recorded, eye contact. Following the interaction, confederates rated, on a scale from 1
(almost none) to 9 (almost constant), the amount of eye contact that their partners
maintained during their introductions.
Post-Interaction Measures: Participant Self-Reports
When the interaction was over, the experimenter took participants and
confederates to separate rooms so that they could complete the remaining measures in
private.
Mood Checklist II. To begin this phase, participants completed a second mood
checklist, identical to that administered prior to the interaction.
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Behavioral plan specificity. Participants also completed measures of how easy
it was for them to think of specific behavioral plans. The first, open-ended, asked,
"What did you try to do or say in your introduction to make it go well, or to keep it
from going poorly? List all the strategies you tried." Summing the number of
strategies listed provides a measure of behavioral plan specificity. Participants then
rated, using a scale from 1 (disagree very much) to 9 (agree very much), how much
they agreed with each of two statements: "I found it easy to think of specific things to
say and do in my introduction," and, "I found it difficult to think of specific things to
say and do in my introduction." Summing scores on these items (reverse-scoring
where necessary) provides a second measure of behavioral plan specificity.
Perceived success. In the same phase, participants reported on how successful
they had been at achieving their goals. Using a scale from 1 (disagree very much) to 9
(agree very much), participants indicated their agreement with two statements: "In my
introduction, I feel that I achieved the goals I wanted to achieve," and, "In my
introduction, I feel that I failed to achieve the goals that I wanted to achieve."
Summing scores on these items (reverse-scoring where necessary) produces a measure
of perceived success.
Following completion of these measures, the experimenter returned once more
and apologized that the experiment had run out of time. Rather than proceeding with
the second introduction and discussion, participants would have to skip to the final
questionnaire.
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The Heterosexual Attitudes Toward Homos^exuals (HATH) .c^^Ip To "help us
interpret our results," the experimenter administered the final measure, the
Heterosexual Attitudes Toward Homosexuals (HATH) scale (Larsen, Reed, &
Hoffman, 1980). This scale allowed us to explore, and control, any effects of
underlying prejudice on avoidance. While we realized that experimental condition
could contaminate scores, we chose to administer the HATH during the same session
because prescreening was simply unfeasible (the questionnaire was too long). In any
case, a subsequent analysis of variance (ANOVA), using goal framing and partner
orientation as independent variables, and HATH scores as the dependent variable,
indicate that experimental condition did not significantly influence scores on the
HATH.
Participants rated their agreement, on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9
(strongly agree), with each of twenty statements about homosexual people (e.g.,
"Homosexuality should be accepted completely into our society"). HATH scores
range from 0 to 1 80, with higher scores indicating more tolerant attitudes toward
homosexuality. In past administrations, the HATH has shown high internal reliability
(split-half reliability coefficients ranging from .86 to .92) and good test-retest
reliability (Pearson product-moment correlations ranging from .74 to .81) (Cemy &
Polyson, 1984; Larsen et al., 1980). Moreover, The HATH demonstrates good
construct validity. Larsen et al. (1980) found that business-oriented people score
lower than liberal arts majors, that highly religious people score lower than less
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religious people, and that people who perceive their peers to have tolerant attitudes
also have more tolerant attitudes.
Additional Confederate Ratines
While participants filled out their questionnaires, confederates completed
supplementary ratings of their interactions. Using 9-point scales, confederates rated
their own comfort levels ("How comfortable were you?") and various characteristics
of their partner's behavior (e.g., "How friendly was your partner's behavior?"). Using
1 5-point scales, confederates also rated the quality of their interactions along 5 related
dimensions (e.g., enjoyable, relaxed).
Manipulation Check, Debriefing
To finish, participants completed demographic questions and manipulation
checks. One key question asked participants whether or not they had introduced
themselves to a heterosexual or a gay person. Several questions probed for suspicions
about the true purpose of the study. The last question asked participants to indicate
their sexual orientations, assuring them that their responses would be held in the
strictest confidentiality.
When the experiment had run to completion, the experimenter began a careful
debriefing. She ensured that participants had understood both the nature and the
purposes of the deceptions. She emphasized that, because the situation is naturally
tense for everyone, people should not use their experiences in the study to make
generalizations about themselves, or about their interactions with others. Finally, she
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provided participants with course credit slips and a number to contact if they wished to
obtain a copy of the results, or to ask further questions about the study.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Scale Construction
To determine whether or not aggregate measures of avoidance should be
created, we began by exploring the relationships among the 3 measures of avoidance
(i.e., chair distance from the confederate, time spent in interaction with the
confederate, and eye contact). Correlations among these measures were generally low,
although measures of time and eye contact showed higher correlations than did the
other measures (for time and eye contact, r = .40,/? < .001 ; for time and distance, r =
.22, p < .01; for distance and eye contact, r = -.02, p = .82). Given these results, we
chose to analyze each measure separately rather creating composite variables.
To produce aggregate measures of mood, we averaged ratings on each of the 6
agitation-calm related emotions, and on each of the dejection-cheerfulness ratings, for
each of the two mood questionnaires, reverse-scoring as appropriate; given that mood
ratings across timepoints were highly correlated (for anxiety, r = .74, p < .001; for
dejection, r = .9\,p< .001), we then summed scores across questionnaires, producing
overall measures of anxiety (12-item a = .92) and dejection (12-item a = .92).
Aggregate measures for behavioral plan specificity and perceived success were
calculated by summing each pair of items aimed at tapping these constructs, reverse-
scoring as appropriate (for behavioral plan specificity, items correlated at r = .85,p <
.001; for perceived success, items correlated at r = .S\,p< .001).
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Confederate ratings of their own comfort levels, their partners, and their
interactions were highly intercorrelated (rs ranged from .76 to .90, ps <
.001); thus,
these ratings were converted to standard (z) scores and summed, producing a
composite measure of partner ratings of the interaction (3-item a =
.93).
Finally, to create an overall scale of prejudice, scores on the HATH were
averaged, reverse-scoring where appropriate (20-item a = .92).
Testing the Central Hypotheses
The primary purpose of the study was to explain and predict avoidance. Our
central hypotheses stated a main effect for partner orientation, a main effect for goal
framing, and differences across control conditions. To test these predictions, we
submitted each behavioral measure of avoidance to a 2 (semester: Fall vs. Spring) x 2
(partner orientation: Straight vs. Gay) x 3 (goal framing: Approach, Avoid, or Control)
ANOVA.
Results do not support the predictions. Regarding the main effect for partner
orientation, these analyses reveal that, if anything, participants avoided Straight
partners more than they did Gay partners. Goal framing had no consistent effects.
Control conditions did differ on one of the analyses, but not in the expected way.
The ANOVA on chair distance produces only a main effect for partner
orientation, F(l, 188) = 4.09,p< .05, revealing that participants interacting with a
Gay partner sat closer to their partners (M= 52.03 inches from the wall) than did
participants interacting with a Straight partner (M= 48.57 inches from the wall).
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The ANOVA on eye contact reproduces the main effect for partner orientation,
F (1, 191) = 5.05, p < .05, revealing that participants interacting with a Gay partner
made more eye contact with their partners (M= 6.60) than did participants interacting
with Straight partners (M= 6.02). The effect is qualified, however, by a significant
orientation x frame interaction, F (2, 191) = 3.70, p < .05. This interaction reveals that
the difference between participants interacting with Gay partners and participants
interacting with Straight partners derives substantially from Control participants:
Contrasts reveal that Control participants interacting with Gay partners made
significantly more eye contact with their partners than did Control participants
interacting with Straight partners, whereas the remaining 4 groups cannot be reliably
differentiated.
The ANOVA on time produces no significant effects.
Alternative Approaches
Reviewing the results, we concluded that outliers might be obscuring hidden
patterns behind the data. Thus, we ran the same analyses excluding outliers on each
measure (i.e., participants scoring two or more standard deviations from the mean).
This strategy failed to yield improvements: excluding outliers, ANOVAs on chair
distance produce only the main effect for partner orientation, while ANOVAs on eye
contact and time produce no significant effects.
We also realized that prejudice level might moderate the expected
relationships. Yet, looking across conditions, scores on the HATH are not associated
with any of the avoidance measures. Further, dividing participants into High and Low
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prejudice groups, and analyzing these groups separately, does not clarify the results.
Instead, these analyses produce scattered and generally marginal effects.
A third possibility was that time of data collection might moderate sensible
patterns in the data. Nevertheless, the absence of significant 2-way or 3-way
interactions between semester and our major independent variables counseled against
analyzing each semester separately.
The Remaining Dependent Measures
The research design also called for assessment of participant anxiety, dejection,
behavioral plan specificity, and perceived success, and confederate ratings of the
interaction were recorded as supplementary measures. For exploratory purposes, 2
(semester) x 2 (partner orientation) x 3 (goal framing) ANOVAs were also conducted
on these measures. However, these analyses all reveal no significant effects.
Correlations between Mood and Goal Framing
An auxiliary goal of the study was to investigate the impact of goal framing on
mood. Earlier sections hypothesized that, consistent with Higgins and colleagues'
research (e.g., Higgins et al., 1997; Roney et al., 1995), avoidance framing would
produce greater changes in agitation-calm-related emotions than dejection-
cheerfulness-related emotions, whereas the reverse would hold for approach goals.
These predictions were tested by computing 8 Pearson correlations. For the
first set of 4, we computed correlations between change in anxiety (post-test minus
pre-test scores) and perceived success, and change in dejection (post-test minus pre-
test scores) and perceived success, for both Approach and Avoid conditions. For the
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Control condition, we divided participants into Gay and Straight partner conditions,
computing separate pairs of correlations for each, yielding another 4 total.
Unexpectedly, these analyses produce only one (marginally) significant
correlation. In the Approach condition, change in agitation and perceived success are
negatively correlated (r =
-.24,;? =
. 056), suggesting that, for these participants,
achieving their goals decreased anxiety. More generally, such weak results argue that
the framing manipulations were ineffective.
Other Findings
A last approach to the data emphasized exploration rather than hypothesis-
testing. In this stage, we computed Pearson correlations between all of the dependent
variables. To simplify interpretation and reduce the probability of finding spurious
relationships, we used a composite measure of avoidance for these analyses, computed
by standardizing scores of chair distance, time, and eye contact, reverse-coding, and
summing. These analyses produce the first interesting results. The general pattern of
results suggests meaningful associations between anxiety, behavioral plan specificity,
and avoidance. Results also reveal associations between avoidance measures,
participants' perceived success, and confederate ratings of the interaction, suggesting
that avoidant behavior constitutes a significant influence on how people feel about
their interactions with others.
Across conditions and across measures, anxiety was significantly related to
participants' avoidance of their interaction partners (r = .21,/> < .01). Moreover, the
ease with which participants were able to think of things to say and do in their
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interaction (i.e., behavioral plan specificity) was significantly associated with both
anxiety (r =
-.28, p < .001) and with avoidance {r =
-.24, p < .001). Thus, the more
anxious participants felt, the more difficult they found it to think of specific things to
say and do within their interactions, and the more they tended to avoid their partners.
Correlations like these suggest meaningful patterns, but do not clarify which
variable (anxiety or behavioral plan specificity) has the critical, causal influence on
avoidance measures. To better determine causality, we conducted two partial
correlations, in accordance with Baron and Kenny's (1986) recommendations. Baron
and Kenny recommend analyzing relationships between two variables (say, A and B)
and an outcome variable (say, C) with two sets of partial correlations, one exploring
the relationship between A and C, controlling for B, and the other exploring the
relationship between B and C, controlling for A. If controlling for A eliminates the
effect of B on C, then variable A can be assigned a central, mediational role in the
relationship between B and C; if controlling for B eliminates the effect ofA on C, then
variable B is assigned the mediational role.
Correspondingly, a first partial correlation analyzed the relationship between
anxiety and avoidance, controlling for the influence of behavioral plan specificity. A
second partial correlation analyzed the relationship between behavioral plan specificity
and avoidance, controlling for the influence of anxiety. Results suggest that anxiety
and behavioral plan specificity jointly influence avoidance. The correlation between
anxiety and avoidance drops only slightly when behavioral plan specificity is
controlled {r = A5,p< .05); meanwhile, the correlation between behavioral plan
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specificity and avoidance, controlling for anxiety, also shows a very minor decrease (r
=
-.20,p<.01).
Interestingly, associations between anxiety and the other variables appear to be
especially strong for participants interacting with Straight (not Gay) partners.
Correlations between anxiety and avoidance, and between anxiety and behavioral plan
specificity, were substantially higher for participants interacting with Straight partners
than they were for participants interacting with Gay partners (analyzing the former
relationship, compare Straight, r =
.25, p < .05, to Gay, r = .17,/? = .10; analyzing the
latter relationship, compare Straight, r =
-.35, p< .001, to Gay, r =
-.21, p <
.05). By
contrast, correlations between behavioral plan specificity and avoidance remain strong
across partner conditions (compare Straight, r = -.23, to Gay, r = -.25, both ps < .05).
This suggests that anxiety played a distinctly more influential role in interactions with
Straight partners than it did in interactions with Gay partners.
Anxiety's role in interactions with Gay partners seems a riddle, but a possible
solution lies in understanding the influence of a fourth variable, prejudice level. In
interactions involving a Gay partner, prejudice level (as assessed by the HATH)
correlated negatively with anxiety, so that, the less prejudiced participants were, the
more likely they were to feel anxious in their interactions (r = -.32,/? < .01 ; compare to
Straight, r = -.02,/? = .82). Paradoxically, the least prejudiced participants felt the
most anxious in their interactions with Gay partners. However, these same
participants may also have been the most motivated to approach their partners (hence
the anxiety), and the most knowledgeable about what to say and do. If so, then their
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motivation and knowledge could override the effects of anxiety, leveling relationships
between anxiety and avoidance, and anxiety and behavioral plan specificity. In other
words, prejudice may have suppressed relationships between anxiety and the other
dependent variables in this condition.
Exploring the relationships between anxiety and avoidance, and anxiety and
behavioral plan specificity, while controlling for prejudice level, should resolve this
question. In fact, correlating anxiety and avoidance levels in the Gay condition,
controlling for prejudice level, increases the correlation nonsignificantly (without the
control, r =
.
1 7, ;? = . 1 0; controlling for prejudice level, r = . 1 9, p = .08). Controlling
for prejudice level in the relationship between anxiety and specificity of behavioral
plan increases the correlation more dramatically (without the control, r = -.21,p < .05;
controlling for prejudice level, r = -29, p< .01). These results do hint that prejudice
level may have suppressed anxiety's influence in interactions with Gay participants.
They also support the more general point that people who are motivated to behave
appropriately in interaction with outgroup members tend to feel anxious about their
interactions, and that this anxiety can prevent them from fully realizing their goals by
making it difficult for them to think of things to say and do and difficult to retain close
contact.
A further set of results suggests that avoidance constitutes a socially important
variable. Avoidance was associated with both participants' and confederates'
impressions of the interaction. Avoidance was negatively correlated with participants'
impressions that they had achieved their goals for the interaction (r = -.16,p < .05) and
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negatively correlated with confederates' aggregate ratings of the interaction (r =
-.58,/;
< .001). These relationships hold constant across Straight and Gay conditions.
Avoidant behaviors, like making infrequent eye contact, sitting far away, and breaking
off the interaction early on, significantly detracted from the quality of the interaction,
for both participants and their partners, whether Gay or Straight.
A more fine-grained analysis reveals that, though none of these behaviors had
special impact on participant ratings of the interaction, eye contact had, by far, the
most striking impact for confederates. Participants' eye contact correlated highly with
confederate ratings of their partners, confederate ratings of their own comfort levels,
and confederate ratings of the general tone of the interaction {rs ranged from .56 to
.72, all ps < .001). Participants' time in the room seems to have had a weaker impact
on confederate ratings, correlating significantly, though not strongly, with confederate
ratings. Finally, chair distance was largely irrelevant to confederates, showing no
significant correlations with any of the confederate ratings. Apparently, both amount
of eye contact and length of conversation substantially influenced confederates'
experiences, but just where participants sat mattered little. Of course, readers will note
that common method variance/halo effects may account for the special relationship
between eye contact and confederate ratings of the interaction. Confederates used
relatively objective means to assess time and chair distance; however, they used the
same, subjecfive rating scales to rate eye contact, their partners more generally, their
own feelings, and the conversation.
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To conclude, although the manipulated variables (i.e., goal framing, partner
orientation) did not affect the dependent measures in the expected ways, results do
reveal meaningful relationships between how participants felt in their interactions,
how they behaved, how they saw themselves, and how they were seen by others.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
Several explanations can account for the failure to find effects. A first
specifies that participants simply did not read, understand, or follow the instructions.
However, this explanation seems unlikely. Across semesters, I supervised participants
as they read the introduction, framing instructions, and slips of paper identifying their
partners. Further, when questioned about the experiment during the debriefing, the
vast majority of participants reported having understood both the experimental
procedures and the alleged orientations of their partners.
Written measures confirm this picture. On their final questionnaires, 93 per
cent of participants indicated that the instructions had been clear, and most correctly
reported the orientations of their partners. Correspondingly, a Chi Square comparing
the frequency with which participants reported having had a Gay or Straight partner,
looking across orientation conditions, produces a value of 108.4, p < .001. Also,
analyses of the framing questionnaires from the fall semester of data collection suggest
that participants generally wrote what we wanted them to write. After coding
participants' statements as expressing primarily approach, avoidance, or neutral goals,
we performed a second set of Chi Squares to compare the frequencies of each type of
statement across the 3 framing conditions. For each statement type (approach,
avoidance, and neutral), the Chi square statistic reaches significance {p < .001);
ftirther, an examination of the means reveals that participants in the Approach
condition produced primarily approach goals, participants in the Avoid condition
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produced primarily avoidance goals, and participants in the Control condition
produced primarily neutral thoughts. Still, it is possible that participants generated the
appropriate outcomes for the framing questionnaire and yet reverted to their own,
idiosyncratic cognitive sets upon entering the interaction (see below).
A related explanation for the null results asserts that participants did not
believe that their partners were, in fact, what their slips of paper revealed them to be.
This explanation seems equally improbable. Most participants expressed genuine
shock upon learning that their partners were confederates of the experimenter.
Although participants in the first semester of data collection were less likely to believe
that their "gay" partners were really gay, only a few participants were highly
suspicious, and these were eliminated from the analyses.
Perhaps the most plausible explanation for the current results states that the
manipulations failed because people strive to create positive impressions of
themselves, regardless of their other motivations and beliefs. By this account,
participants were aware of, and worried about, how their behavior would impress their
partners and the experimenter. As a result, they actively controlled where they sat,
how much eye contact they made, and how long they spent in the room, overriding
more subtle processes. This account would explain why participants sat closer to, and
made more eye contact with, their "gay" partners: They were trying to demonstrate
just how comfortable they were. Also substantiating this view, my post-experimental
conversations with participants suggest that, while most students did not guess
precisely what we were looking for, they were aware that they were being observed
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throughout the experiment, and they were concerned about behaving in a friendly,
prosocial manner. If this reasoning holds, then using dependent measures that are
truly covert, or at least outside the circle of conscious control, would have produced
stronger results. Alternately, preventing participants' usual desire or ability to manage
their behavior (e.g., by making sexual orientation seem peripheral -- not central -- to
the study, or by requiring participants to perform mental arithmetic during the
interaction) might have produced superior results.
A second, also plausible, explanation states that the manipulations failed
because people tend to reject new (and especially negative) ways of construing their
interactions. According to this account, participants resisted framing effects because
they tended to explain away, or quickly forget, the outcomes they generated prior to
their interactions, reverting instead to cognitive defaults. One imagines that this kind
of suppression would be especially likely under avoidance framing, given that people
find it uncomfortable to ruminate on potential disaster. Supporting this explanation, a
survey of the framing questionnaires reveals that participants frequently paired the
outcomes they generated with arguments against their likelihood. For example,
students in the Avoid condition wrote statements like, "She could end up hating me,
but I'm sure that won't happen." Here again, more covert manipulations might have
produced superior effects, resisting this kind of active argumentation.
A last potential pitfall concerns the validity of our avoidance measures. The
current project may have failed to produce effects because our measures of avoidance
accounted for the quantity, but not the quality, of nonverbal behavior. That is,
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although we measured chair distance, we did not record chair orientation; although we
measured amount of eye contact, we did not record type of eye contact. By thus
constricting our measures, we may have lost information. Indeed, research on
nonverbal behavior suggests that subtle, qualitative distinctions matter. For example,
powerful people do not necessarily make more total eye contact than do the powerless;
yet, whereas powerful people make as much eye contact when listening as they do
when speaking, the less powerful look more when listening than they do when
speaking (see DePaulo & Friedman, 1998, for a review). Neglecting to account for
such distinctions probably decreased the accuracy of our measures and reduced the
likelihood of confirming our hypotheses. Future research would profit from a more
thorough review of the measurement, and meaning, of nonverbal behavior.
The current project fell short of confirming its central hypotheses. At the same
time, the more exploratory analyses do provide intriguing leads. Correlational
analyses suggest that, when people feel anxious about their interactions, they tend to
avoid their interaction partners. These findings parallel Stephan and Stephan's (1985)
proposal that anxiety about interacting with ethnic and racial outgroups can prompt
rejection of outgroup members. Current results also suggest that, when people have
no clear schemas for how to behave, they tend to disengage from their interactions.
Such findings support Wurf and Markus's (1991) hypothesis, and GoUwitzer and
colleagues' findings (Gollwitzer & Brandstaetter, 1997; Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998),
that having a clear script for reaching a goal provides the motivation and the means to
succeed at that goal. Curiously, this research suggests that these processes operate
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across intergroup and intergroup relations. Anxiety and uncertainty produced
avoidance in both intragroup and intergroup dyads. Moreover, people avoided their
"straight" partners as much as, if not more than, their "gay" partners.
From the current project's perspective, intergroup and intragroup interactions
look a lot alike. Indeed, the project cannot draw solid conclusions about why people
avoid outgroup members because it did not find disproportionate avoidance of
outgroup members. Still, the results do imply that anxiety and uncertainty drive
avoidance in general. So, to explain people's avoidance of outgroup members in
particular, one need only assume that, normally, if not in the current research, anxiety
and uncertainty are disproportionately high in intergroup relations. Perhaps this
assumption is not far from the truth. The artificial constraints of laboratory interaction
could easily have destroyed naturally-occurring differences in anxiety and uncertainty
levels. Thus, to better address the sources of intergroup avoidance, future research
might explore intergroup and intragroup interactions in more naturalistic settings.
In any case, similarities between intergroup and intragroup interactions should
not obscure the real differences that did surface. For one thing, current results suggest
that anxiety stems from different sources in intergroup and intragroup relations. More
specifically, findings that low prejudiced participants felt more anxious around "gay"
partners than did highly prejudiced participants suggest that the desire to appear
nonprejudiced constitutes a unique source of anxiety in intergroup relations (see
Devine & Vasquez, 1997, for theoretical confirmation of this). Moreover, other
results suggest that anxiety and uncertainty do not necessarily have equivalent effects
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across intergroup and intragroup relations. Correlational analyses suggest that anxiety
played a less influential role in interactions with outgroup members, probably because
less prejudiced people controlled the influence of anxiety on their behavior for the
same reason that they felt anxious in the first place (i.e., a desire to please). Of
course, such results, tentative as they are, do not bear intensive analysis. If nothing
else, the current study testifies to the continuing complexity, and the mystery, of
intergroup behavior.
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